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Abstract:  Most of the commentators so far agree that the precautionary principle can be 
usefully applied to the question of animal sentience. I consider various ways of refining my 
proposals in light of the suggestions. I amend BAR to implement C. Brown’s suggestion that 
the scope of animal welfare law should be extensible by phylogenetic inference from orders 
in which credible indicators of sentience are found. In response to C. Brown, Mallatt, and 
Woodruff, I amend ACT to allow that a single credible indicator may sometimes call for urgent 
further investigation rather than immediate protection. In response to Paez, I amend ACT to 
clarify that cost-effective measures to safeguard the welfare of animals that satisfy BAR should 
be included in any legislation relevant to their treatment in any domain of human activity. I 
consider and decline other suggestions, including Browning’s suggestion that BAR should 
admit anecdotal evidence. I resist the charges that my proposals yield inconsistent advice or 
amount to “fiddling while Rome burns.” I argue that my proposals support the inclusion of 
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I thank all the commentators for engaging so carefully and constructively with my target 
article on animal sentience and the precautionary principle (Birch 2017a). Indeed, I am very 
surprised at the extent to which the commentary has been not only constructive, but also 
sympathetic. As Section 5 of the target article makes clear, there are influential voices who 
would entirely reject any application of the precautionary principle in this area — but these 
voices are currently absent from the discussion. Let me be clear that I welcome their 
involvement in the debate, if they want to join. In the meantime, I will respond to the many 
insightful points raised by the commentaries, most of which are in agreement with the 
fundamental point that the precautionary principle can be usefully applied to the question of 
animal sentience.  
I have organized my responses by theme. Sections 1 to 4 focus on epistemic questions, 
discussing whether my proposed evidential bar for attributing sentience has been set too low 
(Section 1) or too high (Section 2), whether the order is the appropriate taxonomic grain of 
Animal Sentience 2017.081:  Response to Commentary on Birch on Precautionary Principle 
2 
 
analysis (Section 3), and how lists of “credible indicators” should be developed (Section 4). 
Sections 5 and 6 turn to practical questions, elaborating on what it means to bring an animal 
“within the scope” of animal protection law (Section 5) and confronting the objection that the 
precautionary principle yields inconsistent advice (Section 6).  Section 7 discusses the rather 
abstract (but interesting) question of how the precautionary principle relates to 
utilitarianism. Sections 8 to 10 consider particular cases raised by the commentaries: the 
decapod crustaceans (Section 8), other arthropods (Section 9), and unicellular eukaryotes 
(Section 10).  
Section 11 confronts the objection that the entire project of building frameworks for 
enshrining sentience in animal welfare law is “fiddling while Rome burns,” because it does 
nothing to address the main causes of animal suffering. This objection must be confronted, of 
course, but I hope readers won’t mind if I postpone discussion of it until after the more 
specific issues raised by the commentaries have been dealt with. Finally, Section 12 reviews 
my amended proposals and invites further commentary. 
 
1. Is the BAR too low? 
 
Many commentaries focus on BAR, my proposal as to what an intentionally low burden of 
proof for animal sentience should require in practice. Four commentators argue that the 
proposed evidential bar is too permissive in some respects. 
 
1.1. More than one credible indicator? 
C. Brown, Mallatt, and Woodruff call for more credible indicators: Brown and Mallatt call 
for at least two rather than one, to ensure that there are at least two independent lines of 
evidence for sentience, whereas Woodruff calls for “substantially” more than one. Decapod 
crustaceans would still clear the Brown/Mallatt bar, if one counts both motivational trade-
offs (Appel and Elwood 2009; Elwood and Appel 2009) and conditioned place preference 
(Magee and Elwood 2013) as credible indicators, but it would be a higher bar for currently 
under-studied taxa to clear.  
In response, I should note that requiring “at least one” credible indicator is not as lax 
a requirement as it may initially seem. This is because the list of credible indicators should 
be carefully regulated to ensure only indicators with a strong theoretical link to sentience are 
admitted (see Section 4 below). For example, possession of nociceptors is not a credible 
indicator by itself: there must be evidence that nociceptive information is being centrally 
integrated with information from other sources. This is why motivational trade-offs, where 
at least one of the factors in the trade-off is detected by nociception, are a good indicator: they 
indicate that the animal is integrating information about a noxious stimulus with information 
about other things it values and disvalues. Having one indicator of sentience in this relatively 
demanding sense is more of an achievement than having two indicators of a more minimal 
type. 
This does not entirely address the worry about relying on a single experiment or type 
of experiment. The underlying concern, I take it, is that this type of experiment may 
subsequently be found to be methodologically suspect, undermining the case for including 
the relevant order within the scope of animal welfare law. For example (as I noted in the 
target article, and as Woodruff also notes), the experiments from the late 1980s and early 
1990s (Lozada et al. 1988; Bergamo et al. 1992) that appeared to show opiate-induced 
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analgaesia in Chasmagnathus granulatus and Carcinus mediterraneus could not be replicated 
by Barr and Elwood (2011) in Carcinus maenas. As Barr and Elwood (2011) note, an 
alternative explanation for the earlier results is that opiates merely induced “a temporary 
inability to move” (p. 343).  
But we should take a step back here to consider the wider context. The European Food 
Standards Agency’s Animal Health and Welfare Panel (2005) used the earlier experiments as 
a basis for recommending the extension of animal welfare legislation to decapods. The 
recommendation was not implemented — and indeed, the experiments were subsequently 
called into question. At the same time, however, and by the same lab, new evidence of 
sentience (as noted above) was collected — yet there has so far been no policy response to 
this evidence, in either the European Union (EU) or the UK. We see here a systemic problem: 
the tentative and fallible nature of the present evidence (and it is always tentative and 
fallible) is used as a reason to kick the issue of decapod welfare into the long grass, without 
any serious attempt to respond to new evidence when it appears.  
What, then, should happen in a situation in which, at the time of an important policy 
decision, there is tentative, fallible evidence of one credible indicator of sentience in a given 
order, but further work is needed before we have two? Is it reasonable to omit the order from 
the scope of animal welfare legislation, knowing that it could be decades before the issue is 
revisited? It is not: the welfare costs of that decades-long wait are potentially severe. The 
appropriate response is either to include the order in question immediately as a precaution 
or, failing that, to give high funding priority to the search for further indicators of sentience in 
that order and commit to revisit the issue in the short-term. Neither has happened in the case 
of decapods in the EU or UK, and this is a problem (for more on decapods, see Section 8). 
In general, it seems to me that tentative, fallible evidence of one credible indicator is 
enough to warrant action of some kind. The action may take the form of bringing the order 
within the scope of animal welfare law immediately, or it may take the form of commissioning 
further research into sentience in that order as a matter of priority (see Section 5 for the 
incorporation of this into ACT). But there is no justification for continuing inaction in the 
presence of both credible evidence of sentience and knowledge that, if the animals in question 
are sentient, their treatment is severely under-regulated. 
 
1.2. “But AI can do that!” 
Adamo raises an interesting objection: some forms of learning often taken to be indicative of 
sentience in animals can also be achieved by artificial intelligence (AI). Adamo (2016) gives 
the example of the “MoNETA” (Modular Neural Exploring Travelling Agent), an artificial 
neural network developed in 2012 containing 32 million “neurons” and 13 billion 
connections (Ames et al. 2012). Ames et al. (2012) report that MoNETA, when put in control 
of a small robotic rat, learned how to complete the Morris water navigation task, a task in 
which a rat must find its way to a raised platform in a water maze. It is not clear how far the 
project has advanced since 2012.  
Adamo seems to take it for granted that AI is always non-sentient. I suppose I am less 
certain than Adamo that this is the case. I think it is quite possible that by the end of the 
century there will be AI systems with human-level intelligence, and that the sentience of 
these systems will be widely accepted (Bostrom 2014). This will raise difficult ethical, social, 
political and legal issues in its own right (Basl 2013; Bostrom and Yudkowsky 2014). But now 
think about the steps along the way to human-level AI. It seems plausible that the path will 
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involve a sequence of increasingly intelligent artificial minds that are also sentient — but, 
almost inevitably, their sentience will not initially be recognized or taken seriously.  
Could we be at this stage, or close to it, already? Superficially, a deep neural network 
with 32 million neurons appears more complex than a lobster’s nervous system of 100,000 
neurons. Such comparisons are crude, because the “neurons” in AI algorithms are not 
biological neurons, and they lack the rich functional flexibility of biological neurons. 
Nevertheless, are we sure that such algorithms cannot be sentient? Are we sure there are no 
ethical limits on what we can do to them? Speaking for myself, I am not entirely sure. I am not 
proposing that we extend the Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle to AI sentience —
that is a different debate for another occasion. My claim is rather that sophisticated learning 
in AI should not be taken as proof that such learning is possible without sentience. 
Of course, the case of a deep neural network learning about its environment should be 
distinguished from cases in which a robot is simply programmed to display pain-like 
behaviour in response to stimuli. In these cases, the behaviour is not a credible indicator of 
sentience, because information about noxious stimuli is not being integrated with 
information about other aspects of the situation to enable flexible decision-making (see 
Section 4). 
On one important point I do agree with Adamo: animal sentience researchers and AI 
researchers have much to learn from each other. Both fields have a shared interest in non-
human sentience, and both fields must confront the questions of how to detect it, how to 
understand it, and what to do about it. 
 
2. Is the BAR too high? 
 
The critics arguing for a raising of BAR are counterbalanced by four commentators arguing 
that BAR is in some respects too demanding. C. Brown features again here, because he thinks 
BAR, while too permissive in some respects, is also too demanding in others (Section 2.3). 
 
2.1. A presumption of sentience? 
Leadbeater challenges my claim that “there cannot be a default presumption of sentience in 
all cases,” arguing that there should be a default presumption of sentience for all animals. 
Leadbeater further suggests that “a high evidential bar to indicate nonsentience could 
substitute for Birch’s low evidential bar suggesting sentience.” I take the proposal to be that, 
by default, all animals should be included in the scope of animal welfare law, including 
nematodes and sponges — and those who want a particular species excluded should be 
forced to provide strong evidence of the absence of sentience in that species.  
I suspect that such a framework would not work very well in practice, because there 
are no clear standards for evidence of the absence of sentience. If the absence of credible 
indicators of sentience is enough, then we are more or less back to BAR. But if a positive 
indication of non-sentience is required, then we have to say something about what forms this 
could take — and I am not at all clear about this.  
A related concern is that, in the absence of a clear approach to managing exceptions, a 
presumption of universal animal sentience would be toothless. An example is the EU’s Lisbon 
Treaty, an article which states “the Union and the Member States shall, since animals are 
sentient beings, pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals” (European Union 
2007). This is most naturally read as a claim about all animals, not just some. But the reality 
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is that European law continues to apply only to some animals, with the scope of particular 
directives being decided on an ad hoc basis. What is needed is a clear framework for setting 
the proper scope of legislative concern — and this is what my proposals aim to provide. 
 
2.2. Anecdotal and other weak evidence 
Browning argues that anecdotal evidence should be admitted for the purposes of BAR when 
obtained from multiple reliable sources. Browning gives several examples of behaviours, 
such as imitation in orangutans, that have come to be accepted only on the basis of repeated 
anecdotal observations. She further argues that cephalopods — protected in scientific 
research in the EU by the 2010 directive on the protection of animals used for scientific 
purposes (European Union 2010) — could have been protected far sooner if anecdotal 
evidence about their capabilities had been taken seriously. Browning makes a persuasive 
case, and to explain why I ultimately reject it, I will need to say more about my motivation for 
excluding anecdotal evidence. My motivation is not a general mistrust of such evidence, but 
a more specific concern about what happens when it is relied upon in policy-making contexts. 
It goes without saying that whoever is asked to advise on the scope of animal welfare 
legislation will bring their particular values, priorities and interests to the process. For animal 
welfare scientists, it is the consequences for animals that are most salient; for representatives 
of the bioscience sector, it is the consequences for research, and in particular the potential 
medical breakthroughs that may be foregone if research becomes more difficult; and for 
representatives of the food industry, it is the consequences for prices and employment in 
their sector.  
As a consequence of these divergent values, priorities and interests, experts on 
different sides are naturally led to doubt one another’s reliability. We see this dynamic at 
work in my focal case in Section 5 of the target article: the debate over whether decapods 
should have been included in the 2010 EU directive. The AHAW (2005) report overstated the 
case for decapod sentience, given the evidence available in 2005 (prior to Elwood’s recent 
work). The panel described decapods as Category 1 animals, where Category 1 implies that 
“The scientific evidence clearly indicates that those groups of animals are able to experience 
pain and distress.” This overstatement was unsurprising, given the panel’s natural concern 
for protecting decapod welfare — but, unfortunately, it allowed others to cast doubt on the 
report’s reliability. The UK Bioscience Sector (2009) replied in blunt terms: 
 
“The report of the Scientific Committee of the European Food Standards Agency (EFSA) does 
not provide robust scientific evidence to support such an extension. Extensive studies have 
not produced scientific evidence that decapods perceive pain and might ‘suffer’ during 
scientific procedures.” (p. 18) 
 
This was doubly misleading, since there had not at that time been “extensive studies” of 
decapod sentience (indeed, it is still the case that the topic is under-explored), and the most 
recent studies available in May 2009 (e.g., Barr et al. 2008; Appel and Elwood 2009) had in 
fact yielded scientific evidence of sentience. But this too is unsurprising, given the bioscience 
sector’s obvious interest in minimizing regulation of scientific research.  
We thus see how, in the absence of an agreed framework for settling such questions, 
conflicting values, priorities and interests lead to overstatements, distortions and mutual 
mistrust. I do not intend to apportion blame here or declare one side worse than the other. 
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What should be clear is that there is a need for a framework that can be common ground in 
debates of this kind. A key desideratum of such a framework is that it set an objective and 
transparent standard for reliable evidence to which all sides can agree, despite differences in 
their values, priorities and interests.  
This is why anecdotes must be deemed inadmissible. I agree that, in non-adversarial 
contexts in which we aim only to understand animal behaviour, an accumulation of anecdotes 
from sources whose reliability is not in doubt can be a useful source of evidence. But in the 
process of making animal welfare law, it is inevitable that the reliability of the sources will be 
called into doubt — the source will always be suspected by the other side of allowing their 
values to distort their testimony — and so there must be an objective standard of reliability 
that can be called upon to answer these doubts. There is no objective standard of reliability 
for anecdotes. 
Now, one may well question whether statistical significance is really up to the job of 
providing an objective standard of reliability (Irvine does in fact question this in her 
commentary). Recent replication crises across the sciences, and in psychology in particular, 
have raised awareness of the perils of “p-hacking” and publication bias. It may well be that 
normal scientific standards will change as a result: for example, a number of psychologists 
have recently proposed raising the p bar by lowering the standard p-value to p = 0.005 
(Benjamin et al. 2017). My view is that, wherever normal scientific standards go, BAR should 
follow. If normal scientific standards become more stringent, then so should BAR. If that 
means that some experimental results, such as Elwood’s (which would not meet the p = 0.005 
threshold), fall short of the new, more stringent standards, then so be it: the experiments will 
have to be repeated with larger samples.  
This may sound rather conservative — but I think it is the only way to ensure that 
extensions to the scope of animal welfare law are not successfully blocked by the powerful 
forces that invariably resist them. 
Similar considerations apply to R. Brown’s suggestion that, in the absence of 
statistically significant evidence, we should count “multiple, weak, but convergent, lines of 
evidence” as admissible for the purposes of BAR. I agree that there are many species for which 
all we have is “limited, poor-quality evidence.” The problem is that, if BAR were to include a 
clause admitting limited, poor-quality evidence, it would no longer set an objective and 
transparent standard for reliable evidence. For example, there is some very limited, very 
poor-quality evidence of sentience in some unicellular eukaryotes (see Section 10). How 
much better than this does the evidence have to be before a policy response should be 
triggered? BAR provides a clear answer: there must be at least one statistically significant 
experimental result showing at least one credible indicator (where credible indicators are 
defined with reference to a published list; see Section 4). If we excise this element of BAR, it 
will no longer provide a clear answer. 
The commentaries by Browning and R. Brown highlight that the appropriate 
evidential bar depends on the use to which the framework is to be put. I want a common-
ground framework for setting the scope of animal welfare law: one that recognizes the need 
to err on the side of caution while also setting an evidential bar that is clear enough, precise 
enough and demanding enough to command widespread support. For other purposes, such 
as advising animal welfare organizations where to focus their resources, or advising funding 
bodies on where additional research is most urgently needed, a different burden of proof that 
recognizes some forms of anecdotal evidence might be useful. 
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2.3. Extension by phylogenetic inference 
One suggestion I fully agree with is C. Brown’s proposal that we should be able to attribute 
sentience to orders for which we do not have any direct experimental evidence, if we have 
evidence of sentience in enough sufficiently related orders to make a phylogenetic inference. 
For example, if we have sufficient evidence of sentience in the Cypriniformes and 
Salmoniformes, and if considerations of cladistic parsimony make a separate origin for 
sentience in the two orders unlikely, we should infer that the common ancestor of all 
Clupeocephala was sentient — and this should in turn lead us to conclude that the evidence 
of sentience is sufficient in all Clupeocephala. There remains the question of how exactly to 
incorporate this consideration in the formulation of BAR. I suggest the following: 
 
BAR (v1.1):  
(a) For the purposes of formulating animal protection legislation, there is sufficient evidence that 
animals of a particular order (O1) are sentient if there is statistically significant evidence, 
obtained by experiments that meet normal scientific standards, of the presence of at least one 
credible indicator of sentience in at least one species of that order. 
(b) If sufficient evidence by the lights of condition (a) has been obtained for two orders O1 and O2, 
and if normal methods of phylogenetic inference indicate that, conditional on the presence of 
sentience in orders O1 and O2, animals of a third order O3 are also likely to be sentient, then 
there is sufficient evidence that animals of the order O3 are sentient. 
 
I say “normal methods” here to allow (as in condition a) that a variety of different methods 
may be appropriate and that methods may change over time. The point is simply that we 
should not rely on intuitions, hunches or anecdotes, nor should we employ deliberately lax 
methods that would not be used for phylogenetic inference on other traits. 
 
3. Is the order the right grain of analysis? 
 
As Stauffer and Mallatt point out, my reliance on the concept of the Linnaean category of the 
order in formulating BAR looks outdated at first sight. Linnaean higher taxa have no role in 
phylogenetic taxonomy, which is “rank free” (De Queiroz and Gauthier 1992; Mishler 1999; 
though cf. Benton 2001). From a phylogenetic point of view, taxonomic ranks such as the 
order are artificial constructs, not natural kinds. 
The obvious alternative proposal is to revert to “species” and rely on clause (b) in BAR 
v1.1 to extend the scope of legislative concern to larger clades. But the problem here is this: 
what happens when we have evidence of sentience in a single species, and no evidence 
concerning any other phylogenetically nearby species? The alternative proposal says: protect 
only the single species for which you have evidence. My proposal says: paint with a 
deliberately broad brush — protect the entire order.  
It seems to me that my proposal is more in keeping with the imperative to err on the 
side of caution. Despite being an artificial construct, I think the concept of an order turns out 
to be a pragmatically useful one in this context. It groups animals at a deliberately coarse 
grain of analysis, which is what we want. It is also well-known, easy to understand and fairly 
unambiguous. It may be more useful for animal welfare legislation than it is for scientific 
taxonomy — but it is by now a well-known point that different taxonomic concepts are 
appropriate for different purposes (Dupre 1981; Kitcher 1984). 
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4. Towards a more comprehensive list of credible indicators  
 
BAR is of no practical use without an agreed list of credible indicators of sentience. I find 
Feinberg and Mallatt’s (2016) list a useful starting point. Under behavioural indicators, they 
include operant conditioning, trade-off behaviour, frustration behaviour or negative contrast 
(i.e., “degraded behaviour after a learned reward unexpectedly stops”), self-delivery of 
analgesics when injured and conditioned place preference (p. 153). Equally helpful is 
Feinberg and Mallatt’s list of behaviours not indicative of pain: the mere existence of 
nociceptors, classical conditioning (which can be achieved by the spinal cord), reflex 
responses and innate motor programs (p. 152). Stauffer argues that self-delivery of 
analgesics, motivational trade-offs and conditioned place preference are not necessarily 
indicative of pain. The first might be mere addiction (although, to make this less likely, we 
should require that the self-delivery is conditional on injury), whereas the second and third 
might be due to the animal disfavouring a particular stimulus without finding it painful. He 
also suggests that natural selection provides a better explanation of these behaviours; but 
natural selection and sentience are not rivals: the former is an ultimate cause, the latter a 
proximate one (in the sense of Mayr 1961).  
Of course, all these behaviours might conceivably occur without pain, particularly if 
one insists that a state counts as pain only if it feels like human pain. What is harder to dispute 
is that these behaviours require the integration, by the central nervous system, of information 
about past or current injury with information about the animal’s other needs or aspects of its 
environment, in such a way as to enable a flexible response to the situation. I suggest that this 
is the mark of a credible indicator of sentience, because it aligns with a plausible picture of 
the function of aversive feelings such as pain and discomfort for animals that feel them. 
Aversive feelings are guides to decision-making. To make flexible decisions, animals need to 
be able to weigh the seriousness of an injury against other things they need: sometimes 
fleeing is the right thing to do; sometimes carrying on as normal is the right thing to do; 
sometimes tending the injury is the right thing to do — it depends on the situation. Negative 
valence is the currency in which the need to stop, or the need to flee, is measured. When we 
find an animal making flexible decisions by integrating information about past or present 
injury with information about other aspects of its situation, that is a credible indicator of a 
negatively valenced (aversive) experience.  
I call Feinberg and Mallatt’s list a “starting point” because it is surely not 
comprehensive: it includes the credible indicators animal sentience researchers have so far 
thought to investigate, but not all possible such indicators. Mather’s commentary highlights 
the need for a more comprehensive list and makes some helpful suggestions based on her 
work with cephalopods. I agree with Mather that although (in light of the “mark” proposed in 
the previous paragraph) the mere presence of nociceptors is not a credible indicator of 
sentience, the presence of connecting pathways linking peripheral nociceptors to integrative 
brain centres (Criterion 3 of Smith and Boyd’s 1991 list) is a credible indicator. Similarly, 
although I do not think that the mere presence of opioid receptors should be counted as a 
credible indicator, the integration of an endogenous opioid system with mechanisms of 
learning and flexible decision making should count. The upshot is that the apparent 
distinction between neurofunctional and behavioural indicators is not as sharp as it may 
initially seem: the search for one type of indicator informs the search for the other. 
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5. Fleshing out ACT 
 
Paez highlights the need for more detail in ACT, my proposal as to what action is required 
when BAR is satisfied. He asks: which practices should animal welfare law aim to regulate? 
He raises the issue of wild animals: should we attempt to protect sentient animals in the wild, 
or not? My answer is that the treatment of any sentient animal in any domain of human 
activity should be regulated. We cannot regulate the treatment of wild animals to the extent 
that we regulate the treatment of farmed and captive animals, but we can prohibit practices 
(such as fox hunting) that are likely to cause poor welfare. This should extend to regulation 
of the culling of animals for veterinary or conservation reasons, which should be done 
humanely and only as a last resort. 
Beyond that, I think detail about the material content of animal welfare legislation is 
best avoided in a framework such as this — a framework that aims only at fixing its scope. 
Once it is agreed that a previously excluded order should be brought within the scope of 
animal welfare law, there will always be a further debate to be had about whether existing 
law adequately covers the welfare needs of the animals in that order, or whether new law is 
required. But my framework is not intended to settle these debates, only to start them.  
Clause (b) in the revised ACT below is intended to make this clear. Meanwhile, clause 
(c) introduces into the formulation of ACT the concession made in Section 1.1 to C. Brown, 
Mallatt, and Woodruff — the concession that borderline cases in which the presence of one 
credible indicator is disputed, or in which there is one credible indicator but not two, may 
call for urgent further research rather than immediate protection. 
 
ACT (v1.1):  
(a) The scope of animal protection legislation should include all orders of animals for which the 
evidence of sentience is sufficient, according to the standard of sufficiency outlined in BAR.  
(b) When an order of animals is included in the scope of animal protection legislation, cost-
effective measures to safeguard the welfare of these animals should be included in any 
legislation relevant to their treatment in any domain of human activity, including food 
production, scientific research, conservation work and recreational pursuits. 
(c) In cases in which it is disputed whether an order O1 satisfies BAR, or in which there is 
experimental evidence of one credible indicator of sentience in O1 but not evidence of two, it 
may be appropriate to commission further research into the question of sentience in O1 as a 
matter of high funding priority, and to commit to review the status of O1 after a short period 
of time. If no significant new evidence comes to light either for or against sentience, there 
should be a presumption in favour of protecting O1. 
 
6. Inconsistency and proportionality 
 
Critics of the precautionary principle have long argued that it yields inconsistent advice. The 
basic argument is that any precaution creates new risks, leading it to be both mandated and 
prohibited by the precautionary principle (Sunstein 2005). Klein offers a version of this 
objection: 
 
“There is a chance that decapods are sentient […]. The PP says: avoid using them for research. 
Yet perhaps decapod research could help cure cancer, and thereby prevent untold harm to 
sentient humans. (A weak could is all that the PP demands.) The PP says full steam ahead.” 




Part of the problem here is the assumption that there is one precautionary principle, 
applicable to all decisions. We should, I think, switch to talking about precautionary principles 
tailored to particular risks, of which ASPP is one example. My framework does not 
recommend banning research on decapods (it just says: bring them within the scope of 
animal welfare law), nor could it mandate such research — so I see no problem of 
inconsistency looming for my principle. There would be a problem if there were a credible 
risk that extending the scope of animal welfare law would create an environmental or public 
health catastrophe, because this would bring the recommendations of ASPP into conflict with 
other precautionary principles — but there is no such risk. 
In general, these alleged problems of inconsistency are exaggerated. As Klein notes, 
Steel (2013) argues persuasively that such problems are avoided by requiring that any 
proposed precaution must pass a test of consistency (it is not prohibited by the same 
principle used to justify it) and efficiency or cost-effectiveness (“precautions aim to 
effectively minimize a target threat while keeping negative side effects to as minimal a level 
as possible”). Steel uses “proportionality” to refer to the combined requirements of 
consistency and efficiency. BAR and ACT are intended to achieve proportionality in Steel’s 
sense. 
 
7. The precautionary principle and utilitarianism  
 
Ng argues that ASPP can be justified as a special case of a more general principle of expected 
net-welfare maximization, a version of utilitarianism. The basic idea is simple: the expected 
welfare consequences of treating a sentient animal as if it were non-sentient are far worse 
than the expected welfare consequences of treating a non-sentient animal as if it were 
sentient. Given this asymmetry of risk, the way to maximize expected welfare is to treat the 
animal in question as if it were sentient as soon as the probability of sentience exceeds a very 
low threshold (a threshold that depends on exactly how much worse it would be to 
incorrectly regard it as non-sentient). BAR can be interpreted in this light as a practical rule 
of thumb for adjudicating whether the probability of sentience meets this threshold.  
I am sympathetic to the idea that ASPP, and other precautionary principles, can be 
justified on the grounds that they maximize expected welfare over the long run, and to the 
idea that expected welfare maximization should be the overarching goal of animal welfare 
science and policy (see Birch forthcoming). The commentary on Ng’s own recent target article 
in this journal (Ng 2016) contains extensive discussion of whether welfare maximization is 
an appropriate goal, and I won’t discuss this issue further here (although see Section 11). 
However, I will note two qualifications regarding the relation between expected welfare 
maximization and ASPP.  
First, I think one of the attractions of ASPP is that it does not presuppose any particular 
ethical framework (e.g., utilitarianism), but rather aims to capture a common-sense idea (i.e., 
give the animal the benefit of the doubt) that can be justified in various ways. As Ng observes, 
the utilitarian justification is clear enough. However, ASPP might also be justified in 
deontological (duty- or rights-based) terms, as a principle grounded in our duty to animals 
to protect them from unnecessary suffering. This general duty might plausibly be taken to 
ground a more specific duty to assign special priority to mitigating risks of serious negative 
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welfare outcomes when they credibly arise, and my proposed framework can be interpreted 
as a way of fulfilling that duty. 
The upshot is that one can endorse ASPP without endorsing any particular wider 
ethical view from which it may be derived. ASPP is intended to be a common-sense principle 
of broad appeal — not just a principle for utilitarians. Moreover, it is intended to be a 
principle of intermediate generality: a principle not so specific as to apply only to a single 
case or to a very circumscribed set of cases, nor so general as to say nothing more than 
“Maximize expected utility!” or “Avoid unnecessary suffering!” My sense is that a principle of 
this kind is what policy-makers, at least in the UK and EU, currently want and need.  
Second, another attraction of ASPP is that it avoids concerns about the 
commensurability of different types of suffering and welfare — concerns that inevitably arise 
for an expected welfare maximization framework (e.g., Harnad 2016 on Ng 2016). An 
expected welfare maximization framework requires us to weigh (for example) the expected 
welfare benefits to decapod crustaceans of receiving basic legal protections against the 
expected welfare costs to humans, perhaps in the form of (i) higher costs for food producers, 
leading to fewer jobs and higher prices and (ii) more paperwork surrounding scientific 
research, leading to less research being done. I take these costs to be worth paying, but this 
is a qualitative judgement, not a judgement based on a quantitative calculation. As soon as 
one attempts a quantitative calculation of this sort, one runs into problems of 
commensurability: what exactly is the common currency in which decapod suffering and 
human well-being are to be measured? How much does a human have to benefit, and in what 
ways, to offset the suffering of a single crab? How does one even begin to enumerate and 
aggregate these effects?  
ASPP, like other precautionary principles, provides a way of circumventing these 
concerns about commensurability, which can otherwise perpetually delay policy responses 
to developing threats (Steel 2013, 2014). It does so by setting a default evidential bar, and by 
saying: when this bar is cleared, act now, regardless of your concerns about paperwork or 
food prices. Precautionary principles thus offer a kind of “shortcut” decision procedure that 
appropriately applies in cases (such as climate change) when action must be taken quickly to 
mitigate a serious risk, but when a quantitative analysis of expected consequences would be 
subject to potentially endless arguments about the commensurability of qualitatively 
different costs and benefits.  
 
8. The case of decapod crustaceans 
 
I suggested in the target article that the decapod crustaceans were a good example when 
thinking about the use of precautionary reasoning in relation to animal sentience. As noted 
above (see Section 1.1), Elwood and colleagues have found evidence of motivational trade-
offs in hermit crabs (Appel and Elwood 2009; Elwood and Appel 2009) and of conditioned 
place avoidance in shore crabs (Magee and Elwood 2013). Although there is room for 
reasonable debate on this issue, a good case can be made that they satisfy BAR — yet they 
currently fall outside the scope of animal welfare legislation in the UK, EU, USA, and most 
other countries. My proposals therefore indicate that a change in the law may be justified in 
this case (see Birch 2017b). 
An underlying assumption of the entire framework is that when sentient animals are 
not protected by animal welfare legislation, they are put at greatly increased risk of serious, 
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negative welfare outcomes. In the case of decapods, the case can be easily made by pointing 
to practices widespread in the food and fishing industries such as live boiling, live carving, 
and de-clawing — practices that, if inflicted on a vertebrate, would violate even the most 
minimal animal welfare standards (Elwood 2012; Roth and Grimsbø 2016). 
Carder presents a preliminary study of the welfare of lobsters in UK food outlets, 
focusing on restraints, stocking density, lighting and shelter. Conditions are far from optimal, 
with lobsters often housed in very high densities and never given access to shelter. This is a 
salutary reminder that, in the absence of legislative protection, animals can experience poor 
welfare even in public-facing settings such as supermarkets. Of course, we should also be 
concerned about what happens to these lobsters once they are bought — presumably, by 
customers with no training in the slaughter of lobsters and no access to specialist equipment. 
Less obviously, we should also be concerned about what happens to them earlier in the 
supply chain, where they are often held in storage facilities for long periods. It seems to me 
(and I imagine Carder would agree) a welfare scandal that these animals are sold live by 
supermarkets at all, independently of the question of whether their housing conditions are 
adequate. 
 
9. Other arthropods 
 
What of other arthropods? Both Adamo and Mallatt read me as denying the sentience of 
Drosophila fruit flies, but I do not — Drosophila appears in the target article only as an 
illustration of the severe consequences for scientific research of a presumption of universal 
sentience. If insects such as Drosophila are brought within the scope of animal welfare law, a 
very large amount of research would be subject to regulations from which it was previously 
exempt. So be it, if this is where the evidence leads (see the article by Klein and Barron 2016, 
and commentaries, for a discussion of the evidence). But we should be particularly mindful 
of the need to implement feasible, streamlined procedures for the reporting, evaluation and 
approval of projects, and to give careful consideration to the cost-effectiveness requirement. 
 
10. Sentient microbes? 
 
Reber suggests that there is good evidence for attributing sentience to unicellular organisms. 
On first reading, I took him to be arguing (like Leadbeater) for a presumption of universal 
sentience in the absence of sufficient evidence (see Section 2.1), but on a closer reading, it is 
apparent he believes microorganisms (but not plants) actually satisfy BAR.  
Reber goes on to point out that this would leave the law in a difficult position, since 
protecting the welfare of sentient microbes would be unfeasible. He advocates a pragmatic 
approach on which the welfare benefits of regulating the treatment of a given species are 
weighed against the costs to humans. Curiously, Reber cites recreational fishing as an 
example in which the costs to humans might outweigh the benefits to animals, an idea I find 
unfathomable. He adds that “fish feel pain but it's far from obvious how to do anything to 
lessen it within the fishing industry” — but there are detailed reports on how it can be 
lessened (Mood 2010).  
This is an illustration of how universal sentience, while initially sounding like good 
news for animal welfare, soon becomes a counsel of despair: if my own immune system daily 
slaughters billions of sentient bacteria, why worry about commercial fishing? If plants are 
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sentient (a possibility rejected, admittedly, by Reber), could plant-based agriculture be even 
worse for sentient beings than meat production? This line of thought should be resisted —
not by casually dismissing the possibility of microbial or plant sentience, but by setting an 
evidential bar for admission into the scope of legislative concern and rigorously applying that 
bar.  
So what is the evidence of sentience in microbes? Reber mentions the observations, 
by Jennings (1902, 1906), of a graded sequence of responses to a noxious stimulus in ciliates 
of the Stentor genus, reviewed (as part of a comprehensive review of “intelligent behaviour” 
in protozoa) by Trewavas (2014). Trewavas (2014) describes the response of Stentor to 
being blasted with a stream of carmine particles: 
 
“The cell responded initially by bending the mouth to avoid these particles. The organism 
exercises choice. It repeated this action of bending several times if the initial bending failed. If 
the stream continued, the cilia reversed direction to drive the particles away. If this procedure 
continued to fail to stop the particles entering the mouth, the cell contracts into the tube. After 
a short time, the cell can re-emerge and try again to feed normally. If the carmine particle 
stream is continued, the contraction periods increase in length. Eventually, if the stream 
continues, then the Stentor cell exhibits violent contractions to break the adhesion of the foot 
and swims away.” (p. 205) 
 
The increasing length of the contraction periods is suggestive of avoidance learning, though 
I do not regard very limited forms of avoidance learning as credible indicators of sentience: 
to indicate sentience, they must involve the integration of information about a noxious 
stimulus with information about other aspects of the situation (see Section 4). Intriguingly, 
another stentor specialist, Tartar (1961), adds: 
 
“From my own observations it appears that stentors from cultures which have recently been 
fed are more likely to persist in the feeding response and to give the graded response, as if 
bothered by the interruption of a good thing, whereas unfed animals are more likely to detach 
and swim away at once, as if the negative stimulus finally prodded them to “decide” to go in 
search for food.” (pp. 20-21) 
 
The latter remark is suggestive of a motivational trade-off: the stentor acts as if trading off 
the positive valence of the food against the negative valence of the carmine particles. 
However, this is not a statistically significant experimental result — it is just a report of 
anecdotal observations (cf. Section 2.2). Even if the trade-off exists, it would take further 
work to show that it results from information processing rather than from a mechanical 
effect, such as interference between the mechanisms of feeding and detachment. For these 
reasons, the remark should be read as a hypothesis rather than a result. The same can be said 
of Jennings’s work in the early 1900s. A descriptive account of personal observations, though 
potentially a fruitful source of hypotheses, is not evidence of the right sort to satisfy BAR. 
But suppose further investigation were to vindicate the observations of Jennings and 
Tartar. What then? If we found just one credible indicator of sentience (e.g., motivational 
trade-offs), the case would fall under clause (c) of ACT v1.1 (see Section 6), and further 
research should be funded as a matter of high priority. What if this research uncovered 
further credible indicators? We would face a difficult choice: remove the relevant indicators 
from the list of credible indicators of sentience — on the grounds that they turn out to be 
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present in creatures without nervous systems — or give stentors a basic degree of legal 
protection. I’m not sure what my own response would be, and I don’t think I need to prescribe 
one here. This is a debate that must be had if solid scientific evidence of credible indicators 
of sentience in organisms without nervous systems arises. At present, I take there to be no 
such evidence. 
 
11. Fiddling while Rome burns 
 
Marks objects that my target article is an exercise in “fiddling while Rome burns”: 
 
“Animal ethics concerns a pressing, perhaps the most pressing ethical issue of our time: the 
immiseration and slaughter or extinction by human agency of sentient beings on an 
unprecedented scale. Much work, including of the mind, needs urgently to be done. But fine-
tuning the treatment of confined or captured animals by the scientific investigation of 
sentience is not part of it, it seems to me.” 
 
There are three parts to this “big picture” concern. The first part is that I regard disputed 
cases of sentience — such as fish, arthropods and cephalopods — as genuinely difficult cases 
in need of further scientific investigation, when in reality it is (Marks contends) obvious from 
cursory observation of their behaviour that even clams and scallops are sentient. I don’t think 
it is obvious, and I think the scientists who are trying to bring evidence to bear on these 
questions are doing valuable work. 
The second part is that it is naïve to think policy can be made responsive to science in 
the way my proposals require, given the long history of policy-makers ignoring relevant 
science (as documented in the commentaries by Jones and Rollin) — and given the suffering 
that humans continue to inflict on mammals and birds, despite the wide acceptance of 
sentience in these taxa.  
I am not as pessimistic as Marks, Jones, or Rollin on this score. These commentaries 
taken together present a bleak picture of US animal welfare policy, but I take the UK and EU 
contexts to be more favourable to my aims. The EU is committed to recognizing animal 
sentience via the Lisbon Treaty, and is also committed to the precautionary principle, but has 
no rules for applying the latter to the former. The UK government recently refused to 
incorporate the relevant article of the Lisbon Treaty into the EU Withdrawal Bill, but, after 
substantial criticism, published a statement committing to recognize animal sentience in UK 
law in some form (Gove 2017). My proposals are intended to help lawmakers in the EU and 
UK achieve their own stated aims. They clarify which animals should be recognized as 
sentient, and what steps should be taken to protect animals so recognized. Policymakers 
looking for a framework for recognizing animal sentience in a meaningful way would do well 
to embrace ASPP, BAR and ACT. 
The third part of the “fiddling while Rome burns” objection is that, even if the first two 
parts are set aside, there remains the concern that my proposals target animal welfare, not 
animal liberation. Animal welfare, Marks argues, “serves animal industries as a convenient 
sop to citizen and consumer conscience.” This point echoes several of the commentaries on 
Ng’s (2016) recent article (Bekoff and Pierce 2016; Clark 2016; Leadbeater 2016; Marino 
2016; Marks 2016). I don’t think I can convince this particular kind of animal welfare sceptic, 
but I do not aim to do so. My aim is to combat a different kind of sceptic: one who maintains 
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that fish or invertebrates could not possibly be sentient, and so could not possibly be 
deserving of even the basic protections we extend to mammals and birds. This is not to 
presuppose that existing protections for mammals and birds are adequate: only to 
presuppose that some protection is better than none. 
 
12. Review of the amended framework (v1.1) 
 
I will close with a brief review of my amended proposals and an invitation for further 
commentary. As before, the framework consists of an overarching principle or “meta-norm” 
(ASPP), an evidential bar (BAR) and a policy response (ACT). I have left ASPP unchanged. BAR 
incorporates the change suggested by C. Brown (Section 2.3), and ACT incorporates changes 
in light of commentaries by C. Brown, Mallatt, Woodruff, and Paez  (Sections 1.1 and 5). 
 
ASPP:  
Where there are threats of serious, negative animal welfare outcomes, a lack of full scientific 
certainty as to the sentience of the animals in question shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent those outcomes. 
 
BAR:  
(a) For the purposes of formulating animal protection legislation, there is sufficient evidence that 
animals of a particular order (O1) are sentient if there is statistically significant evidence, 
obtained by experiments that meet normal scientific standards, of the presence of at least 
one credible indicator of sentience in at least one species of that order. 
(b) If sufficient evidence by the lights of condition (a) has been obtained for two orders O1 and O2, 
and if normal methods of phylogenetic inference indicate that, conditional on the presence of 
sentience in orders O1 and O2, animals of a third order O3 are also likely to be sentient, then 
there is sufficient evidence that animals of the order O3 are sentient. 
 
ACT:  
(a) The scope of animal protection legislation should include all orders of animals for which the 
evidence of sentience is sufficient, according to the standard of sufficiency outlined in BAR.  
(b) When an order of animals is included in the scope of animal protection legislation, cost-
effective measures to safeguard the welfare of these animals should be included in any 
legislation relevant to their treatment in any domain of human activity, including food 
production, scientific research, conservation work and recreational pursuits. 
(c) In cases in which it is disputed whether an order O1 satisfies BAR, or in which there is 
experimental evidence of one credible indicator of sentience in O1 but not evidence of two, it 
may be appropriate to commission further research into the question of sentience in O1 as a 
matter of high funding priority, and to commit to review the status of O1 after a short period 
of time. If no significant new evidence comes to light either for or against sentience, there 
should be a presumption in favour of protecting O1. 
 
I welcome further commentary on any aspect of these proposals, including (i) the list of 
credible indicators; (ii) the most appropriate taxonomic grain of analysis; and (iii) the 
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WORKSHOP 7: Suzanne Held & Michael Mendl: Pig 
Cognition and Why It Matters 
James Simmons: What Is It Like To Be A Bat? 
Debbie Kelly: Spatial Cognition in Food-Storing 
Steve Phelps: Social Cognition Across Species 
PANEL 8: Social Space 
WORKSHOP 8: To be announced 
Lars Chittka: The Mind of the Bee 
Reuven Dukas: Insect Emotions: Mechanisms and 
Evolutionary Biology 
Adam Shriver: Do Human Lesion Studies Tell Us the 
Cortex is Required for Pain Experiences? 
PANEL 9: The Invertebrate Mind 
WORKSHOP 9:  Delcianna Winders: Nonhuman 
Animals in Sport and Entertainment    
Carel ten Cate: Avian Capacity for Categorization and 
Abstraction 
Jennifer Mather: Do Squid Have a Sense of Self? 
Steve Chang: Neurobiology of Monkeys Thinking 
About Other Monkeys 
PANEL 10: Others in Mind 
WORKSHOP 10: The Legal Status of Sentient 
Nonhuman Species  
 
 
 
 
 
